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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the competitiveness in the banking sector of eight countries in the SADC 
region. Both the Panzar-Rosse and the Lerner Index approaches were used for the period 
2002- 2013. Although the results yield opposing outcomes, the overall findings suggest that 
the eight countries cannot be described as being perfectly competitive but rather suggest 
imperfect competition in these banking sectors. These countries could be characterised as 
monopolies when using the Panzar-Rosse study and monopolistically competitive when using 
the Lerner Index. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The Southern African Development Community (“SADC”) exists to liberalise the economies 
of its region in an attempt to improve livelihoods of the people of Southern Africa. It is for 
this reason that it strives to build an efficient integrated banking system that will better 
facilitate trade among member countries and with the rest of the world.  
 
Over the years, African banking systems have experienced significant transformations 
following long periods of underperformance. For instance, open market operations have 
replaced interest rate controls in countries like Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania, as well as 
directed lending in Uganda (Fosu, 2013). Another area of change within each sub-region is 
the significant privatisation of state-owned banks (for example Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and 
Zambia) as an attempt to minimise inefficiencies. Furthermore, in response to increased 
regional integration and advances in information technology, there has been a significant 
upward trend in cross-border banking allowing customers to operate their accounts outside 
their home country (Fosu, 2013). These reforms have implications for the banking sector, 
competition in particular. It is believed that sufficient competition among banks will 
significantly improve stability in the banking sector. A competitive banking sector is 
understood to be more efficient, in terms of delivery, for the users of bank services. 
Restraining competitive pressures can result in welfare losses (Cetorelli, 2001). Banks with 
monopoly power are more likely to charge higher interest rates and prices to clients while 
lowering rates of return to depositors. Higher rates discourage entrepreneurial incentives to 
undertake risky yet profitable projects and limit small firms from accessing financial capital, 
weakening the stability of credit markets further. Without competitive pressures banks limit 
technological innovation and productivity within the financial sector- creating inefficiency 
problems. This can slow economic growth of a country. Economic growth is crucial for the 
SADC countries if they are to meet their targeted goals of improving the wellbeing and the 
overall standard of living of their citizens.  
 
Various fiscal and monetary policies are implemented in order to achieve the targeted goals. 
However, these policies are not distinct from the banking structure of an economy. There are 
inconsistencies between the effects of monetary policy shocks on economies with different 
competitive banking sectors. Few studies have examined the relationship between competition 
in the banking industry and the effects of monetary policy. Stiglitz and Greenwald’s (2003) 
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investigate both competitive and restricted banking systems, and show that in a competitive 
system the effect of raising interest rates on bank lending is weaker than in a more restricted 
setting. In their model, there is an emphasis on the wealth effect, through which an increase in 
interest rates leads to a decrease in deposits. Since the wealth effect is relatively small in a 
competitive banking system, the effect of monetary policy is then weaker. 
 
Although it is expected that a high degree of competition is important for any market, several 
negative aspects of high competition can still be identified. Shaffer (1998) shows that the 
average quality of a bank’s pool of borrowers declines as the number of competitors in the 
market increases. Other studies, Peterson and Rajan (1995), have focused on the role banks 
play in financing new businesses. They show that young firms with no record of past 
performance may actually receive more credit, and at better rates, if they are in a market 
where banks have monopolistic power. Theoretically high competition can to some extent 
eliminate banks that are unable to continuously lower costs and innovate in order to remain 
competitive. This can be destructive for a sector that is already struggling to meet the 
increasing financial demands in the African economy. However, these should not raise doubts 
about the beneficial welfare impact of bank competition on the economy; it merely implies 
that some optimal level of competition should exist to control for the negative aspects. 
 
The financial sector is the pillar of any economy. Bank loans and investments divert funds 
into productive uses, creating businesses, jobs and a higher standard of living (SADC, 2012). 
To ensure that there is stability in the financial sector a sufficient amount of competition must 
exist. As highlighted before, competition is important for: innovation, improving consumer 
surplus, monetary policy effectiveness and increasing access to finance to small firms.  In 
Africa, where the aim has been to increase entrepreneurial activities, sufficient competition 
can encourage individuals to participate in these activities. Currently, entrepreneurship is 
limited by the lack of innovation in the financial market, which leads to higher start-up costs 
and higher risk of entering a highly concentrated market. The significance of this study is to 
produce knowledge, on the competition structures of banks in the SADC countries, which can 
assist with the constraints mentioned. There are insufficient studies, which investigate the 
extent of competition among SADC banks. This is highly odd as the Southern region has a 
prominent financial sector compared with other regions on the continent and research of this 
sort can be highly beneficial for development purposes. 
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Studies of banking competition are crucial for Southern Africa where the ever-changing 
financial system is broadly bank based-implying that any bank failures and inefficiencies 
would have serious consequences for the various economies.  
 
In view of the above, this study aims to narrow this gap in literature by: 
a) Using two modern approaches, Panzar-Rosse and Lerner Index to analyse how 
competitive banks in the SADC region are, following years of financial reforms.  
b) It will compare the outcomes of the two approaches to determine whether they yield 
robust conclusions. 
 
The findings in the paper suggest that, depending on what approach is used, the SADC 
banking sectors exhibit both monopoly and monopolistically competitive characteristics. 
Consequently it can be concluded that the eight SADC countries cannot be described as being 
perfectly competitive but rather suggest imperfect competition in these banking sectors. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the banking sector in the 
region. Section 3 gives background into past literature on bank competition. Section 4 and 5 
describes the data as well as methodologies used for each study. Section 6 provides the results 
to both methodologies. Section 7 will analyse the robustness of the two approaches and 
section 6 will conclude. 
2. Overview of banking sector in the SADC region 
 
The SADC countries’ financial infrastructure has, to a large extent, been influenced by 
colonialism. Initially foreign-owned financial institutions were set up to exclude African 
interests and development objectives (Harvey, 1991). Following independence governments 
had to adjust these gaps; banks were nationalised or new state-owned banks were started.  The 
SADC countries experienced massive restructuring of their financial sectors in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. In Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola banks became entirely state-owned 
while in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe ownership was mixed or 
concentrated in private hands. Previously, the majority of banks in these countries supplied a 
limited range of products and with the banks dominating the financial sectors with the 
exception of South Africa and Zimbabwe, which had developed stock markets; efficiency was 
low because competition between banks was limited. The service was poor and there lacked 
innovation. 
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Although the SADC region is analysed as a group it should be noted that the banking sectors 
in each country are unique to each particular country.   African banking sectors are well below 
the standards of developed countries, despite recent reforms across the continent. However, 
the Southern-African region boosts the continent with its well-developed and sophisticated 
banking systems (for example South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles and Malawi). 
There are many countries in the southern region with total banking sector assets exceeding 
US$500 million compared to the West African region (Nigeria, Ghana and Togo) (Fosu, 
2013). Beck et al. (2011) estimated that an average bank in Africa has total assets of USD 220 
million compared with the balance sheet of a non-African bank with an average of about out 
USD 1 billion in total assets. 
 
Financial intermediation, process performed by banks of taking in funds from a depositor and 
then lending them out to a borrower, remains low in Southern regions. This is reflective of the 
low bank efficiency in the region. As can be seen in Table 1, financial intermediation (as 
measured by the ratio of private sector credit to GDP) is higher in upper middle-income 
countries, notably South Africa and Mauritius, but less in low-income countries (Malawi, 
Uganda, and Tanzania) and those that recently graduated into middle-income status, such as 
Zambia. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of financial systems in selected Southern African countries 2008-2012 
Country Private credit/GDP Accounts per 1000 people Stock market turnover 
ratio (%) 
Ghana  14 298.8 5.9 
Kenya 29 328.4 13.9 
Malawi 11.7 102.4 2.1 
Mauritius 80.8 823.4 10.1 
Namibia 44.5 635.3 3.4 
Nigeria 31.1 245.6 24.3 
South Africa 75.8 882.9 69.9 
Tanzania 14.4 126.6 6.7 
Zambia 11.8 153.7 14.8 
Source: World Development Indicators and Cihak et al. (2012). Note: Countries were selected on the basis availability of data. 
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Table 2: Financial access and outreach in selected Southern African countries, 2012 
Country Borrowers from 
commercial banks 
(per 1000 adults) 
Commercial bank 
branches (per 1000 
adults) 
Interest rate 
spread (lending 
rate-deposit rate) 
Risk premium 
on lending 
Angola - 11.4 13.1 12.7 
Botswana 212 8.6 7.4 - 
Malawi 17 3.3 21.3 16.5 
Mauritius - 21.6 2.4 5.6 
Mozambique 31 3.8 5.4 11.2 
South Africa - 10.4 3.3 3.4 
Tanzania 28 2.2 5.9 3.5 
Zambia 19 4.4 5.1 -1.9 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Most of the countries in the region also suffer from low levels of financial penetration or 
outreach. For instance in Zambia only a third of the adult population has access to a bank 
account. Further, as Table 1 illustrates, the severity of financial exclusion is mostly 
manifested in the low number of bank accounts per 1,000 people. This illustrates that there 
aren’t enough financial institutions willing or ready to carter for all classes in the economy. It 
can also be the result of the lack of transparency in the economies.  
3. Literature Review 
 
There have been two main approaches for determining the level of competition in the banking 
sector. These include structural and non-structural tests which both consider the relevant 
characteristics of banks. One structural approach includes the structure-conduct performance 
(SCP), while the non-structural approaches have been promoted within the New Empirical 
Industrial Organisation (NEIO). This section will analyse the evolution of these approaches 
starting with the theory presented by the SCP and the arguments of the modern approaches. It 
will conclude with an empirical analysis of the studies in this field of research. 
3.1 Theoretical literature 
 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance model (SCP) defined as the relationship between market 
structure, firm conduct and firm performance suggests that the existence of entry barriers is 
the major determinant of firm profits, thus the greater cost of entry makes it easier for existing 
monopolistic firms to maintain profits. According to microeconomic theory, the structure of 
the market influences the conduct and behaviour of firms (Sinkey, 1986). The term structure, 
in the framework of SCP model, refers to the number of banks serving in the entire industry. 
Market structure depends on various factors such as competition, regulation as well as 
technological and economic conditions. Conduct refers to the behaviour of the banks in the 
 6 
market. This can include pricing, marketing and innovative behaviours of the business of 
banking. Lastly, performance refers to the quantity and quality of products and services 
provided by the banks in the industry, which determine the profit levels. 
SCP model assumes that market structures identified by many firms providing the same 
products and services, though relatively equal in firm size, are competitive markets generating 
greater performance. Then, the degree of concentration of banks’ output in a market affects 
the extent of competition among these banks. The extent of competition affects the price that 
consumers pay for banking services, which determines the level of profits and performance. 
The SCP framework suggests that higher concentration leads to higher prices, which in turn 
lead to higher profits. According to Bain (1951) traditional market SCP claims that market 
structure influences conduct (behaviour) of firms through pricing policies, and this in turn 
influences firm performance. The relationship between profitability and market structure has 
generated competing hypotheses. There are theoretical criticisms to the SCP framework 
suggested by Demsetz (1973) and later by Berger (1995). These critics believe that the larger 
market shares, which lead to a higher level of concentration, may be as a result of better 
efficiency and lower costs rather than a low level of competition. Others (Mullineux & 
Sinclair, 2000) argue that concentration may lead to higher prices and as a result lower 
demand, however, it does not mean that a highly concentrated banking sector will have higher 
profits.  
It is for this reason that the new approaches (NEIO) were introduced to measure competition 
and the view is that both industry structure and performance are determined by other factors; 
so the approach tests competition and the use of market power but does not assume a causal 
relationship between market structure and performance (Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Bresnahan, 
1989). The Bresnahan and Panzar-Rosse as well as the Lerner-Index and the PE indicator, fall 
into this part of the literature. The most commonly used structural models are the Panzar and 
Rosse (Rosse & Panzar, 1987) and the Bresnahan approaches (Bresnahan, 1982). Models 
specify that how banks behave depend on the market structures in which they operate. Unlike 
structural methods they do not ignore the relationship between market contestability and 
revenue behavior at the firm level. 
Lately it has been argued that conventional measures of competition like the Lerner- Index 
and the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic may not assess bank competition in certain economies 
correctly. The argument is that certain financial rules like the existence of interest rate 
regulations influence the outcome of these approaches. Instead the relatively new Profit 
 7 
Elasticity (PE) indicator may be better suited to investigate competitive conditions given any 
characteristics of the banking industries. This indicator, whose theoretical base is the Relative 
Profit Differences (RPD) concept, is based on the idea that competition rewards efficiency 
(Boone et al., 2007; Boone, 2008). The PE indicator will be stronger the more competitive the 
market is. 
3.2 Empirical literature 
 
Although there has been theoretical criticism of the SCP model, several studies (Berger & 
Hannan, 1989; Neumark & Sharpe, 1992 and Okeahalam, 1998) support the framework. 
Okeahalam (2001), by analysing the concentration in the industry, attempts to measure the 
level of competition in the South African banking sector, hence, explore whether or not the 
current industrial structure of the sector has an impact on the pricing of retail banking deposit 
products. The investigation followed the SCP framework and concludes that the South 
African banking sector is highly concentrated. This normally leads to a high likelihood that 
there will be a collusive oligopoly in the industry. The findings are used to discuss whether 
this influences the behaviour of banks in credit extension to the currently excluded market 
sector, the impact it has on the aggregate social welfare function and possible policy 
implications. Falkena et al. (2004) is another study of the concentration in the South African 
banking sector, which was carried out as part of a Task Group Report for The National 
Treasury and the South African Reserve Bank. The study used the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index to determine the concentration in the financial sector. They found that the South 
African banking sector was in fact highly concentrated, however, based on Falkena et al. 
(2004) findings the high costs and lack of access to banking services for small and micro-
enterprises may have more to do with a number of structural factors than the level of 
competition in banking. It was difficult to identify studies extending the SCP approach to the 
Southern region; making it safe to conclude that there is a lack of this sort of literature in 
those regions. This paper aims to increase the availability of literature for SADC studies. 
 
Several studies have attempted testing for competition in the banking sector by the modern 
approaches. Using a sample of US banking data for the period 1979, Shaffer (1982) identifies 
a monopolistic competitive banking behaviour in the US. Other earlier applications of the 
model are in respect of Canadian banks (Nathan & Neave, 1989) and European banks 
(Molyneux et al., 1994). Nathan & Neave (1989) find monopolistic competition in the 
Canadian banking sector for the period 1983 and 1984 but perfect competition in the period 
1982. Using a sample of European countries over the period 1986 to 1989, Molyneux et al. 
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(1994) find that banks in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK) behave as 
though operating under monopolistic competitive conditions whilst those in Italy are classed 
as though operating under monopoly or conjectural variation short-run oligopoly conditions. 
Greenberg and Simbanegavi (2009) use both the Panzar-Rosse and the Bresnahan to test for 
the level of competition in the South African bank sector taking into account that banks 
behave differently depending on the market in which they operate. They arrive at the 
conclusion that the sector faces a high level of monopolistic competition. Using the Lerner-
Index, Gaertner and Sanya (2012) find that the degree of competition in the East African 
Community is low due to a combination of structural and socio-economic factors. The 
analysis ranks the countries in terms of banking sector competitiveness in the following order: 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. 
To explore both time series and cross-sectional variations, applications of the Panzar-Rosse 
model employ a panel data estimation approach. Studies taking this approach include Al- 
Muharrami et al. (2006) for the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) banking system; 
Bikker & Haaf (2002) for 23 European Union and non-European Union countries and De 
Bandt & Davis (2000) for a sample of French, German, Italian and US banks. The results of 
the above studies are generally consistent with monopolistic competition with the exception 
of a few submarkets. 
A recent change in the study of banking competition has been the shift towards regionally 
classified markets. The reasons behind such a classification include similarity of banking 
market features. Based on the similarities of characteristics within South Eastern European 
countries, Mamatzakis et al. (2005) class these countries’ banking sectors as a single banking 
market and estimate Panzar-Rosse H-statistic for the entire region over the period 1998 to 
2002. Depending on the choice of dependent variable, different H-statistics are documented. 
Moreover, following the introduction of the single Banking Licence in the European Union 
(EU), Casu & Girardone (2006) apply the Panzar-Rosse model to the study of 15 major 
European countries’ banking sectors, assuming a common banking market. Their results show 
that, between the period 1997 and 2003, EU banks behaved as though operating under 
monopolistic competition. They find H-statistics of 0.362 and 0.364, based on the model 
specification. In a similar fashion, Fosu (2013) using a dynamic version of the Panzar-Rosse 
to assess the overall extent of banking competition in each sub-regional banking market over 
the period 2002 to 2009 conclude that African banks generally demonstrate monopolistic 
competitive behaviour. 
It is evident that the Panzar-Rosse model has been the preferred approach, making it obvious 
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that there are not enough studies, of the other modern approaches, in the literature. This paper 
takes a different approach in that it will present three results on the extent of bank competition 
in the SADC region using different modern approaches. The view is that increased regional 
integration together with advances in information technology and the banking sector reforms 
mentioned earlier justify the assumption of single banking markets within the Southern 
African regions.  
4. Data  
The data used is bank data from all the registered locally controlled and foreign controlled 
banks in each of the SADC countries. For both the Panzar-Rosse and the Lerner Index annual 
data for the period 2002-2013 was used. In the analysis we focus on consolidated data from 
commercial and savings banks as well as bank holding companies. Excluded are real-estate 
and mortgage banks, investment banks, other non-banking credit institutions and specialized 
governmental credit institutions. 
Data availability determined which countries were included in the study; although it would 
have been beneficial to have all the countries’ data it is understandable that data restrictions in 
the region limited this. The data was obtained from various sources providing information and 
data on banks across the continent. These include Bankscope and the financial reports 
obtained directly from the various banks’ websites. This data was fairly feasible; although, 
this research acknowledged that certain countries would not have all the data required to carry 
out the study; in that case the respective countries were excluded from the study. The study 
excluded any banks or periods with missing, negative values or zero values from inputs and 
outputs and other relevant data. This sample was restricted to banks with five or more 
observations for each country, which is enough to observe significant changes. This did not 
have any major drawbacks on the reliability of the study. Also the study uses either the 
consolidated or the unconsolidated statements depending on which one is available.  
Table A1 in the appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in both 
tests in the study. 
5. Methodology 
 
This study will use two modern approaches; the Panzar-Rosse model and the Lerner-Index. 
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5.1 Panzar-Rosse Approach 
 
The Panzar-Rosse model, popularised by Rosse & Panzar (1977) and Panzar & Rosse (1987), 
is an approach to measuring competition that is based on a reduced form revenue or price 
equation. Many published P-R studies estimate a revenue function that includes total assets 
(or another proxy of bank size) as a control variable. Other articles estimate a price function 
instead of a revenue equation, in which the dependent variable is total revenue divided by 
total assets. For the purpose of this study the revenue equation will be used. Also, different 
banks will earn more revenue in ways unrelated to variations in input prices so bank specific 
control variables are added to the model. 
From this revenue equation, a measure of competition, H-statistic, is obtained by summing the 
elasticities of revenue with respect to input prices. The H-statistic measures the degree of 
competition as the extent to which a change in factor input prices is reflected in revenues 
earned by a specific bank in equilibrium. Under perfect competition, an increase in input 
prices raises both marginal costs and total revenues by the same amount as the rise in costs. 
Under a monopoly, an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce 
equilibrium output and consequently reduce total revenues. The H-statistic is estimated from a 
reduced form bank revenue equation as the sum of the elasticity of the total revenue of the 
banks with respect to the bank’s input prices. The H-statistic varies between 0 and 1, with the 
following interpretation; 
 
Because elasticities are required to obtain the H-statistic, the following reduced form log-
linear revenue equation is used. This is a variation of the Panzar and Rosse (1987) 
methodology:  
𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝑇it) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1ln(W1,it) + 𝛽2ln(W2,it) + 𝛽3ln(W3,it) + 𝛾1ln(Z1,it)  + eit 
where i denotes banks and t denotes years. Empirical banking literature often takes interest 
income as revenues to capture only the intermediation activities of banks (e.g. Bikker and 
Haaf, 2002). Similarly, INT is total interest revenue (proxy for banks’ output price), W1 is the 
ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding (proxy for input price of 
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deposits), W2 is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (proxy for input price of labour) 
and W3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets (proxy for 
input price of equipment/fixed capital). Z is a matrix of controls including the ratio of equity 
to total assets, the ratio of net loans to total assets, and the logarithm of assets. These two 
control variables account for the differences in risks, costs and structure of the individual 
banks.1 Total Assets will not be included as a proxy for size. According to Bikker et al (2009) 
only the unscaled revenue equation yields a valid measure for competitive conduct.  
However, the appropriate Panzar-Rosse test, based on an unscaled revenue equation, 
generally requires additional information about costs and market equilibrium to allow 
meaningful interpretations.  
Finally, αi denote bank-level fixed effects. The H-statistic equals 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3.  
5.2 Lerner Index  
The Lerner index of market power captures pricing power by measuring a bank’s ability to set 
price above its marginal cost. It is defined as the difference between banking output prices 
and marginal costs (“MC”) all relative to prices. In a perfectly competitive system, the price a 
bank charges for its services should be equal to its MC and therefore, such a bank will have 
no market power. The greater the deviation, the less competitive the banking system is 
interpreted to be. By construction, the index ranges from a high of 1 to a low of 0, with higher 
numbers implying greater market power. The Lerner index is calculated as: 
Lernerit =(Pit - MCit)/Pit 
The subscript i denotes bank i and the subscript t denotes year t. Price Pit is the ratio of total 
revenues (interest and noninterest income) to total assets for bank i at time t, and MCit is the 
marginal cost for bank i at time t. 
The marginal cost will be derived, in order to extract the elasticity of total cost to the price of 
the bank’s main inputs. Taking the derivative with respect to total assets from the following 
translog cost function derives the marginal cost: 
lnCit = ∝0i + 𝛽0lnQit + 𝛽0 0.5[lnQit ]2  +  ∝ 1lnW1it +  ∝ 2lnW2it +  ∝ 3lnW3it + 𝛽2l lnQit*lnW1it + 
𝛽3lnQ1it *lnW2it + 𝛽4lnQit*lnW3it + ∝4lnW1it *lnW2it + ∝5 lnW1it *lnW3it + ∝6lnW2it *lnW3it +                                                         1 Due to the unavailability of data within the Africa region these are the only two control variables used for this study. This will also ensure that we maintain an efficient sample size. 
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∝7 0.5 [lnW1it]2  + ∝80.5 [lnW2it]2 + ∝90.5 [lnW3it]2  + ∝10ln(Equity)it + ∝11ln(Net Loans)it + F 
+ Y + e 
The variables in the above equation are defined in table A2. 
Assuming that the slope of the cost function within a country is constant through time, the 
MC for all banks in the study is calculated from the translog cost function regression over the 
data range. Using the estimated coefficients from the translog cost regression the MC is 
calculated as follows: 
MCit = ( 𝛽0 + 𝛽1* lnQit + 𝛽2*lnW1it + 𝛽3*lnW2it + 𝛽4*lnW3it ) * (Cit /Total assets) 
This equation implies that variations Q, W1, W2, W3, C, total assets and P result in variations 
in bank-level Lerner for each country. 
6. Empirical results  
6.1 Panzar-Rosse  
The revenue equation is estimated using the bank specific fixed effects (“FE”) regressions and 
the feasible generalised least squares (“FGLS”) method. The study uses the FE within-group 
estimator technique to account for the heterogeneity amongst the different banks. Given that 
the technique eliminates the heterogeneity by differencing the sample observations around 
their sample means, there is no need to use the dummy variable method (Gujarati & Porter, 
2009). FGLS is used, as time series data is likely to exhibit autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity problems. The OLS models for each country were tested for serial 
correlation and the results support the theory that in our time series data the residuals are 
correlated with each other. 
Given that the variables used in the unscaled revenue equations are ratios of total assets, two 
regressions were ran for the FGLS approach; a scaled variable regression and an unscaled 
variable regression (correcting the variables to prevent distortions). This is done by replacing 
all the explanatory variables which are a ratio of total assets, and which have a correlation 
coefficient higher than 0.482, with the residual values. Table A3 was used for the analysis of 
correlation among the varibales. For each country the H-statistic is obtained by taking the 
average of both the FE and the FGLS regressions.                                                          2 This is the correlation coefficient cut-off value as used in Bikker et al (2012) and followed in Gwatidzo et al. (2012). 
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Reported below are the regression outputs of both the FE and the FGLS approaches for each 
country (See table 4 and table 5). On average the H-statistics based on the within estimator are 
not very different from the FGLS statistics with the exception of Malawi, Mauritius and 
Tanzania. Malawi has the biggest difference, which could be the result of the scaling. For the 
a priori expectations of the regression results refer to table 6 in the appendix. The critical 
values, which were used to determine the significance of the t-statistics of the Panzar-Rosse 
test, are presented in table A5. 
Angola 
Based on the fixed effects estimation the coefficient on the input price of deposits (LnINTEX) 
is positive (0.3712) but insignificant. An increase in LnINTEX should result in in a reduction 
in interest revenue as fewer people make use of the service. Like in any market when a 
service becomes expensive the consumer will move away from it. The input price of labour 
(LnPE) is negative at -1.810 and significant at the 5% level. Lastly the input price of fixed 
capital (LnOE) is negative (-0.425) and significant. The signs of the input prices depend on 
the competitive environment in which the banks are operating. This implies that the signs 
might differ for the respective banks. All the control variables appear to be positive with only 
net loans to assets being significant at the 5% level. The sign of loans to total assets (Net 
Loans) is in line with theory as it is expected to be positive for the revenue equation. Table A5 
represents the a priori signs of coefficients in the Panzar-Rosse regressions. Banks 
compensate themselves for credit risk by means of an additional charge to the lending rate, 
which then increases its interest income (Bikker et al, 2012). As a result the ratio of equity to 
total assets is expected to have a negative impact on interest income. This is not the case, 
however the coefficient for this is insignificant.  Summing the three main variables yields an 
H-statistic= -1.863 rejecting the two null hypotheses that H is statistically different from zero 
and unity (see table 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
Table 3: Panzer-Rosse H-statistics 
 
 
Table 5 displays the results for the FGLS approach. Using the panel FGLS estimation the 
signs of the input prices of deposits, labour and fixed capital remain the same at 0.473, -0.441, 
-0.989 respectively. LnPE yields insignificant results. Both equity and loans have the correct 
signs according to theory and are both significant at the 5% level. An increase in other income 
will increase interest revenue however its coefficient is insignificant. The H-statistic = -0.957 
which is also statistically different from zero and unity. 
Averaging the two we get an H-stat= -1.41 which implies that banks in Angola behave like 
monopolies. This is the result of many banks being unable to offer sufficient banking services 
and at reasonable costs.  
Botswana, Malawi and Mauritius 
Botswana fixed effects estimation coefficient on the LnINTEX is negative (-3.014) and 
significant; LnPE (2.266) is positive and significant at the 5% level while the LnOE is 
negative (-0.221). Its control variables appear to be negative with only equity and other 
income being significant at the 5% level. Equity has the correct sign according to theory. The 
ratio of equity to total assets is expected to have a negative impact on interest income. 
Summing the three main variables yields an H-statistic= -0.969 rejecting the two null 
hypotheses that H is statistically different from zero and unity. 
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Using the panel FGLS estimation LnPE and LnOE yield contradicting results to what theory 
suggests. The H-statistic = -0.957 is statistically significant from zero and unity. 
Averaging the two we get an H-stat= -0.98 which implies that banks in Botswana behave like 
monopolies.  
Malawi and Mauritius produce the same signs for the FGLS estimation. The coefficients on 
LnINTEX, LnPE, and LnOE are negative. The control variables are positive with all three 
being significant at the 5% level. The average H-statistics are -0.72 and -2.476 for Malawi 
and Mauritius respectively. Rejecting the two null hypotheses that H is statistically different 
from zero and unity. 
Averaging the two we get an H-stat= -0.72 which implies that banks in Malawi behave like 
monopolies. This is the result of many banks being unable to offer sufficient banking services 
and at reasonable costs.  
The sample size for these three countries in particular was very small given the data 
constraints in a lot of the African countries; this can explain the deviation from theory. 
Mozambique and Zambia 
Based on the fixed effects estimation the coefficient on LnINTEX is positive and significant 
for Mozambique  (0.583) while Zambia carries a negative a sign (-0.388); LnPE is positive for 
Mozambique and negative for Zambia. Both of these statistics are significant at the 5% level. 
Lastly, LnOE is negative for both Mozambique and Zambia (-0.924 and -0.310 respectively). 
All the control variables appear to be positive with only other income for Zambia being 
negative but insignificant. The signs of net loans to total assets is in line with theory as it is 
expected to be positive for the revenue equation. Equity has the correct sign for both 
countries, which is negative. Summing the three main variables yields the following H=0.296 
and H= -1.787 for Mozambique and Zambia respectively, rejecting the two null hypotheses 
that H is statistically different from zero and unity for Zambia. For Mozambique we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that H is statistically different from zero. This suggests that data 
may not fully support the argument that banks in Mozambique behave in a monopolistically 
competitive manner. 
Using the panel FGLS estimation the signs on LnINTEX, LnPE and LnOE differ slightly 
from the FE results for Mozambique but not for Zambia. Both equity and loans have the 
correct signs, for Zambia, according to theory and are both significant at the 5% level. The H-
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statistics = 0.569 and -0.797 which is also statistically different from zero and unity. Thus, for 
Mozambique, competition coexists with high levels of banking market concentration, 
suggesting contestable market behaviour. 
Averaging the two we get H-stat= 0.432 and -1.292 for Mozambique and Zambia 
respectively. This implies that banks in Mozambique monopolistically competitive while 
those in Zambia behave like monopolies.  
South Africa and Tanzania 
For the two largest countries in the study (in terms of number of banks and financial systems) 
the fixed effects estimations of LnINTEX is positive and significant for Tanzania (0.753) and 
negative (-0.032) but insignificant for South Africa. Higher wages lead to a decrease in 
interest revenue for South Africa and an increase in revenue for Tanzania. The coefficient for 
South Africa is aligned with theory; hence it is significant at the 5% level while that of 
Tanzania is insignificant. Two of the control variables have the same signs, positive net loans 
(which supports theory) and negative other income. The signs on equity are negative for 
South Africa and positive for Tanzania. How equity impacts revenue is most likely dependent 
of how these banks use it to generate revenue. Equity being used to innovatively transform the 
efficiency of a bank can result in higher interest, which is the case for Tanzania.  This 
indicates that lower leverage reduces interest income for SA and increases it for Tanzania. 
The three main variables yield the following H-statistics, H=-0.659 for SA (rejecting the two 
null hypotheses that H is statistically different from zero and unity). For Tanzania H= 0.253, 
where null hypothesis that H is different from zero cannot be rejected. 
Using the panel FGLS estimation the signs of LnINTEX switch for the two countries. South 
Africa has the following values for LnINTEX, LnPE and LnOE; 0.597, -0.382, -0.316 
respectively. For Tanzania the same variables are -0.331, -0.049, -1.152 respectively. Both 
equity and loans have the correct signs according to theory and are both significant at the 5% 
level. SA H-statistic = -0.101 which is statistically not different from zero. H-statistic for 
Tanzania= -1.532 and is statically different from zero and unity. It’s unusual to obtain 
negative H-statistics for South Africa and Tanzania as most studies have found a positive 
statistic. Testing for competition in the South African banking sector for the periods 1998-
2008, Greenberg et al (2013) find a H-statistic of 0.69 while Bikker et al. (2012) arrive at an 
estimate of 0.410. Gaertner and Sanya (2012) find a statistic of 0.56 for Tanzania after testing 
for bank competition in the East African Community. 
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Averaging the two we get an H-stat= -0.38 and -0.639 for SA and Tanzania respectively 
which implies that banks in both these countries behave like monopolies. 
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Table 4: Panzar Rosse H-statistic using panel fixed effects estimation3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        Parentheses denote the t-statistic as represented in the FE estimation where (*, **, ***) is the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Dependant Variable: LnINT 
Variables Angola Botswana Malawi Mauritius Mozambique South Africa Tanzania Zambia 
LnINTEX 0.3712 
(1.58) 
-3.014 
(-6.80)** 
0.325 
(1.94)*** 
0.053 
(0.34) 
0.583 
(3.82)** 
-0.032 
(-0.32) 
0.753 
(5.15)** 
-0.388 
(-2.56)** 
LnPE -1.810 
(-4.31)** 
2.266 
(5.26)** 
-0.962 
(-2.54)** 
-0.299 
(-1.08) 
0.637 
(2.32)** 
-0.299 
(-2.80)** 
0.282 
(1.07) 
-1.089 
(-3.90)** 
LnOE -0.425 
(-1.29) 
-0.221 
(-0.94) 
0.615 
(1.78)*** 
-0.349 
(-2.12)** 
-0.924 
(-3.15)** 
-0.328 
(-4.81)** 
-0.782 
(-3.23)** 
-0.310 
(-2.03)** 
Equity 0.569 
(1.04) 
-0.784 
(-3.12)** 
0.069 
(0.21) 
-1.003 
(-4.05)** 
-1.175 
(-5.64)** 
-0.289 
(-2.00)** 
0.214 
(1.01) 
-0.165 
(-0.71) 
Net Loans 1.828 
(4.5)** 
-0.104 
(-0.21) 
1.504 
(6.14)** 
0.915 
(3.98)** 
2.667 
(4.71)** 
0.174 
(1.58) 
0.987 
(3.70)** 
0.146 
(1.54) 
Other Income 0.220 
(0.72) 
-0.592 
(-5.16)** 
0.417 
(1.38) 
0.352 
(2.34)** 
0.310 
(2.19)** 
-0.466 
(-4.50)** 
-0.254 
(-0.98) 
-0.049 
(-0.24) 
Constant 18.132 
(8.06)** 
12.719 
(12.64)** 
23.437 
(20.69)** 
17.721 
(15.47)** 
18.311 
(16.58)** 
16.450 
(27.30)** 
25.039 
(19.88)** 
11.756 
(10.21)** 
H-stat -1.863 -0.969 -0.022 -0.595 0.296 -0.659 0.253 -1.787 
No of obs 
Number of banks         
 
126 
12 
76 
7 
79 
8 
98 
10 
111 
11 
164 
15 
179 
20 
106 
10 
F(x,y) 11.15 32.22 9.03 7.82 24.16 14.53 12.91 7.24 
Prob> F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 5: Panzar Rosse H-statistic using panel FGLS estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        4 Equity corrected for scale 5 Net Loans corrected for scale 6 Equity and OE corrected for scale 7 PE corrected for scale  Note: Parentheses denotes the Z-statistic as represented in the FGLS estimation where (*, **, ***) is the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Dependant Variable: LnINT 
Variables Angola Botswana4 Malawi5 Mauritius Mozambique6 South Africa Tanzania Zambia7 
LnINTEX 0.473 
(1.88)*** 
-3.524 
(-6.80)** 
-0.246 
(-1.21) 
-0.667 
(-3.38)** 
0.179 
(1.05) 
0.597 
(6.28)** 
-0.331 
(-3.21)** 
-0.621 
(-5.20)** 
LnPE -0.441 
(-1.19) 
2.764 
(5.26)** 
-0.446 
(-0.95) 
-0.979 
(-3.16)** 
-1.726 
(-11.31)** 
-0.382 
(-1.85) 
-0.049 
(-0.23) 
-0.244 
(-1.07) 
LnOE -0.989 
(-3.91)** 
-0.231 
(-0.94) 
-0.726 
(-2.57)** 
-0.235 
(-1.22) 
2.116 
(13.18)** 
-0.316 
(-2.00)** 
-1.152 
(-4.98)** 
0.068 
(0.39) 
Equity -0.944 
(-2.79)** 
-0.594 
(-3.12)** 
0.100 
(0.30) 
0.895 
(3.76)** 
0.026 
(0.09) 
-1.164 
(-4.39)** 
-0.381 
(-1.76)*** 
-0.161 
(-0.69) 
Net Loans 1.556 
(4.77)** 
-0.337 
(-0.21) 
0.572 
(1.55) 
1.372 
(4.55)** 
0.169 
(0.33) 
1.261 
(4.63)** 
1.473 
(9.37)** 
0.426 
(3.48)** 
Other Income -0.115 
(-0.39) 
0.754 
(-5.16)** 
0.282 
(0.83) 
1.189 
(6.51)** 
-0.041 
(-0.30) 
-0.195 
(-1.03) 
0.773 
(3.16)** 
0.566 
(2.64)** 
Constant 17.698 
(12.43)** 
20.314 
(12.64)** 
17.586 
(13.19)** 
21.371 
(16.63)** 
14.137 
(16.06)** 
17.958 
(33.95)** 
21.132 
(20.07)** 
18.033 
(18.79)** 
H-stat -0.957 -0.991 -1.418 -1.881 0.569 -0.101 -1.532 -0.797 
No of obs 
Number of banks 
 
126 
12 
76 
7 
79 
10 
98 
10 
111 
11 
164 
15 
179 
20 
106 
10 
Wald chi2(6) 76.01 72.17 17.61 137.44 209.32 424.27 115.68 50.48 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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From the regression outputs the H-statistics for each approach are averaged in order to obtain 
a single value for each country. 
Table 6: Average H-statistics per country 
 
In the recent Banking Enquiry carried out by the Enquiry Panel of the Competition 
Commission (Jali et al. 2008), it was concluded that the South African banks were not acting 
as a cartel. Despite this, the panel also believes that the cost and trouble involved for 
customers to switch banks weakens the competitive effect of price differences between banks. 
This reduces competition in the market, resulting in certain banks carrying large proportions 
of the market power in the country. 
Given that most of the studies on banking competition (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006 & Bikker et 
al., 2012) report results that are consistent with monopolistic competition, the findings of this 
study suggest that recent financial sector reforms and structures in Africa (eg. increase in 
foreign banks and cooperation between regions) may be affecting the different samples used 
in each of the studies. Table A6 gives a brief analysis of the banking systems in the eight 
countries. These characteristics are essential as they affect each country’s results.  
As mentioned above, most of the statistics in the sample study yield negative results that 
contradict past literature. This is the result of many banks being unable to offer sufficient 
banking services and at reasonable costs. Financial access in Africa is lower than most 
developing countries. Within each country a few banks already dominate the market, which 
makes it difficult for smaller and newer bank to gain market power; this causes a lot of banks 
to struggle to remain operational. This is further aggravated by the introduction of foreign 
banks into the local markets. In countries like Botswana, where foreign banks dominate the 
market, it has become almost impossible for the local banks to remain competitive in those 
challenging environments. However, a negative value may arise under various conditions. In 
this case more information about costs and the cost curves is generally needed to infer the 
degree of competition in addition to the correct H-statistic. According to Shaffer (1982b, 
1983a) theoretically a profit maximizing equilibrium in which a firm faces a fixed demand 
 Angola Botswana Malawi Mauritius Mozambique South 
Africa 
Tanzania Zambia 
H-stat -1.41 -0.98 -0.72 -2.476 0.432 -0.38 -0.639 -1.292 
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curve with locally constant elasticity and locally linear cost, H can be negative because it 
equals 1 plus the firm’s perceived elasticity of demand (less than 1). Also if the cost curve is 
flat at the point where the firm chooses to produce then it is possible to observe a negative H. 
We can conclude that some of the banks in the countries above are affected by one of these 
conditions. For the purpose of this study we will assume that one of the two caveats explains 
the negative H-statistics estimated. 
The above findings contradict Fosu (2013) who by using the static Panzar-Rosse model 
estimated using the panel fixed effect estimation technique. The study indicates how banks in 
the Southern African region exhibit slight market power compared with the other regions.  
The H-statistics are positive and statistically significant for all the sub-regional banking 
markets. North Africa has the highest H-statistic (0.534), followed by West Africa (0.509), 
East Africa (0.437) and Southern Africa (0.357). 
6.2 Lerner Index  
This study follows several literatures on the Lerner Index. 8  A constrained fixed effects 
regression with time dummies is estimated under restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity 
of degree one in the price of inputs. The study allows for time effects, as it is believed that 
certain economic factors could have led to changes in the cost function. However, only a year 
dummy for 2008 will be included to account for the global financial crisis that affected 
financial sectors across the globe. This two-way effects model was also tested against the 
fixed effect within-estimator model and for all the countries this model proves to be a better 
fit. This constitutes our preferred model.9  
The regression output is presented in table 7 below. Immediately it can be noted that the 
coefficients for total assets (LnQ) are positive and significant at the 5% level for all the 
countries in the study. In Angola, Malawi and South Africa the coefficients for the input price 
of deposits (LnW1) are negative but insignificant, while the rest of the countries have positive 
estimates. Again Angola and South Africa along with Mauritius and Tanzania have negative 
signs for the input price of labour (LnW2). This is inconsistent with theory, as an increase in 
personnel expenses should increase the operation costs to the bank. Looking at the estimates                                                         8 There is extensive literature measuring bank competition using the Lerner Index. See Berger, Klapper and 
Turk-Ariss (2009), Anzoategui, Peria and Rocha (2010), and Gaertner and Sanya (2012), among others. 9 There were some exceptions from countries like Botswana and Malawi, which could be the result of the small 
data samples. However, using the two-way effect model for these countries should not have a major impact on 
the outcome of the analysis. 
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for other operating expenses (LnW3), only Botswana and Zambia estimates contradict theory. 
However the negative values are insignificant which imply that there exists a gap between the 
literature and data. The next variables of interest are the control variables (equity and net 
loans). Equity is estimate to have a negative and significant coefficient for all the countries 
excluding Angola. Only Angola, Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and Zambia have 
negative signs for net loans while the rest are positive. However, the negative sign on net 
loans should not be concerning as the loans could be used to condense the banks’ existing 
costs. In this case an assumption that the benefits of reducing the total costs, using the loan 
amounts, outweighs the cost incurred on the loan. The estimate on the time dummy that was 
added to capture the effects of possible structural changes in the banking sectors is 
satisfactory. The results of all the countries, excluding South Africa and Tanzania, are 
insignificant which indicate that structural changes did not impact bank operations in these 
countries. However, given the size of these economies it is unlikely that this was the case. The 
results could have been skewed by the lack of sufficient data in these countries. As can be 
seen for South Africa and Tanzania, the 2008 financial crisis seems to have had an impact on 
bank operations.  
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Table 7: Lerner Index using the fixed effects10 regression with year dummies 
 
Dependent Variable: LnCost 
Variables Angola Botswana Malawi Mauritius Mozambique South Africa Tanzania Zambia 
LnQ 1.064 
(16.13)** 
1.169 
(3.72)** 
1.236 
(5.67)** 
0.904 
(4.50)** 
.928 
(8.86)** 
1.293 
(6.72)** 
1.263 
(17.68)** 
1.131 
(6.03)** 
0.5LnQ2 -0.005 
(-1.84)*** 
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
-0.010 
(-0.97) 
0.011 
(1.09) 
.002 
(0.49) 
-.005 
(-0.46) 
-0.007 
(-2.82)** 
-0.003 
(-0.30) 
LnW1 -0.221 
(-2.03)** 
0.536 
(0.98) 
-0.014 
(-0.08) 
0.601 
(2.04)** 
.538 
(5.43)** 
-.332 
(-1.20) 
0.312 
(3.78)** 
0.192 
(0.83) 
LnW2 -0.470 
(-2.12)** 
0.467 
(0.78) 
0.549 
(1.31) 
-0.315 
(-0.60) 
2.449 
(0.64) 
-.147 
(-0.36) 
-0.257 
(-1.48) 
0.794 
(1.48) 
LnW3 1.480 
(7.88)** 
-0.432 
(-0.79) 
0.672 
(1.84)*** 
0.203 
(0.42) 
.396 
(1.56) 
.566 
(1.84)*** 
1.030 
(6.81)** 
-0.167 
(-0.34) 
LnQ*LnW1 -0.010 
(-2.17)** 
0.020 
(1.18) 
0.018 
(2.12)** 
-0.004 
(-0.45) 
-.016 
(-2.86)** 
.0101 
(0.74) 
0.008 
(2.44)** 
0.015 
(1.19) 
LnQ*LnW2 -0.010 
(-1.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
-0.016 
(-0.81) 
-0.021 
(-1.24) 
.109 
(0.52) 
.014 
(0.71) 
0.016 
(2.60)** 
-0.032 
(-1.17) 
LnQ*LnW3 0.003 
(0.43) 
0.025 
(0.99) 
-0.008 
(-0.46) 
.073 
(3.20)** 
.011 
(0.84) 
.019 
(1.08) 
-0.012 
(-1.89)*** 
0.030 
(1.17) 
LnW1*LnW2 -0.146 
(-5.46)** 
0.066 
(0.53) 
0.038 
(0.98) 
-.217 
(-5.51)** 
-.205 
(-13.39)** 
.076 
(2.60)** 
0.015 
(1.36) 
0.035 
(1.37) 
LnW1*LnW3 -0.080 
(-4.38)** 
-0.011 
(-1.71)*** 
-0.224 
(-8.43)** 
.161 
(5.80)** 
(omitted) -.116 
(-3.79)** 
-0.197 
(-19.09)** 
-0.053 
(-2.23)** 
LnW2*LnW3 0.153 
(6.24)** 
-0.011 
(-0.11) 
0.0301 
(0.54) 
.133 
(2.04)** 
.987 
(1.39) 
.033 
(1.17) 
0.022 
(0.67) 
-0.117 
(-3.43)** 
0.5[LnW1]2 9.67e-17 
(11.11)** 
0.242 
(2.88)** 
0.178 
(6.30)** 
.015 
(0.36) 
.133 
(13.03)** 
-.150 
(-8.16)** 
0.200 
(24.11)** 
0.041 
(2.88)** 
0.5[LnW2]2 -0.089 
(-7.84)** 
0.059 
(0.69) 
-0.012 
(-0.11) 
-.158 
(-1.46) 
-28.710 
(-2.63)** 
-.055 
(-1.53) 
0.011 
(0.29) 
0.153 
(4.49)** 
0.5[LnW3]2 0.095 
(8.41)** 
0.083 
(0.49) 
0.168 
(4.37)** 
.130 
(4.20)** 
.243 
(5.60)** 
.184 
(8.87)** 
0.220 
(6.72)** 
0.119 
(3.18)** 
Equity 0.076 
(2.840)** 
-0.021 
(-0.47) 
-0.072 
(-3.33)** 
-.095 
(-3.84)** 
-.059 
(-4.98)** 
-.054 
(-1.68) 
-0.033 
(-5.24)** 
-0.040 
(-2.09)** 
Net Loans -0.019 
(-1.10) 
-0.032 
(-0.82) 
0.020 
(0.99) 
.037 
(0.79) 
-.003 
(-0.34) 
-.076 
(-2.81)** 
0.019 
(2.48)** 
-0.008 
(-1.04)                                                         10 Included in the regression are dummies that represent the bank-specific effects for each bank. Each country contains (N-1) dummies, where N is the number of banks in the sample of each country.  
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T2008 -0.004 
(-0.20) 
0.0193 
(0.81) 
-0.013 
(-0.68) 
.010 
(0.75) 
-.006 
(-0.81) 
0.073 
(2.66)** 
-0.009 
(-2.09)** 
-0.005 
(0.12) 
Constant -0.460 
(-0.63) 
-2.167 
(-0.58) 
-2.025 
(-0.95) 
.775 
(0.33) 
.972 
(0.89) 
-4.317 
(-2.17)** 
-2.970 
(-3.11)** 
-1.462 
(-0.87) 
F(x,y) 7548.75 2085.26 2261.49 4080.11 13012.58 4250.15 19352.06 14476 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 
Number of banks 
 
0.999 
12 
0.998 
7 
0.999 
8 
0.999 
10 
0.997 
11 
0.999 
15 
0.999 
20 
0.999 
10 
Lerner Index11 0.524 0.406 0.487 0.367 0.351 0.410 0.460 -0.924 
 
                                                        11 Lerner Index is calculated as (P-MC/P) where P= total gross revenue of the bank to total assets and MC= marginal cost as calculated using the estimated coefficients (see LI methodology). 
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Using the coefficients of the regression output, the Lerner Index for each country was 
calculated. The Lerner Index ranges between -9.24 in Zambia and 0.524 in Angola. 
Figure 1 below illustrates that Angola, Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania have the 
highest indices (52%, 48.7%, 41% and 46% respectively) of the 8 countries. These 
countries are the least competitive, which implies that they are not too far from 
behaving like monopolies. Clerides et al. (2013) estimated the degree of competition 
in the banking sector of 148 countries over the period 2007-2010 estimate the 
following indices for these four countries; 39.3%, 40.7%, 20.7%, 40.1% respectively. 
The estimates for Malawi and Tanzania are not too far off (ranging between 40% and 
50%) for the two studies. Gaertner and Sanya (2012) find an index of 32% for the 
period 2001-2008. The differences could be explained by factors such as data 
selection, sample size, and variables of choice and estimation methods. The indices of 
the other four countries Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique and Zambia are 40.6%, 
36.7%, 35.1% and -92.4% respectively, not too far away from the top four countries 
(with the exception of Zambia). Clerides et al. (2013) estimate 31.2%, 26.6%, 29.6%, 
and 23.0% respectively. The mean values for the two studies were calculated and the 
following values were found, 26.0% for this study and 31.4% for Clerides et al. 
(2013). It is not uncommon for the Lerner Index to take on negative values, the case 
for Zambia. According to Solis and Maudos (2008), this denotes ‘super competition’ 
which occurs when banks price below marginal cost-such as the case of initial 
subsidisation. Musonda (2013), who studies bank competition in Zambia, found that 
the Lerner Index for the country begins to decline into the negatives post 2008. The 
paper suggests that this could be the result of new banks trying to gain market share 
or existing banks trying to emerge from the global financial crisis by reducing prices 
in order to regain their market share. 
Although we find different results, it can be concluded that all 8 countries typically 
have an insignificant amount of market power suggesting that banks in the SADC 
region have competitive market systems. Perhaps they can be characterised by a 
monopolistically competitive system. This is consistent with the above study, which 
finds that Sub-Saharan African, East-Asian and Pacific banking systems seem to be 
the least competitive ones.  
Figure 1: Average LI over time comparison per country 
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The above statement can be supported by individually analysing bank performance in 
each of these countries (see graph A1).  
Looking at Angola we can see that prior to 2007 banks such as Banco Sol, and Banco 
Keve exhibited low market power compared with the other banks. Banco Keve 
declined drastically from its 2002 position. However this all changed after 2007 
where all the banks in the sample have a constant trend around the same average 
between 0 and 1 for the rest of the period. This is also true for Tanzania, which has a 
constant trend. In Malawi the LI’s for each bank are also following the same trend 
with one or two banks standing out above the rest. Majority of the banks in SA only 
start experiencing gradual increases in the LI’s post the 2005 period. ABSA is the 
only bank that seems to have experienced a drastic decline between the periods 2002 
and 2006. 
All the graphs illustrate some type of an increase in market power just before the 2008 
mark. This pattern change may reflect the sharp increase in financial globalisation 
before the financial crisis in 2007/2008 and related reforms and the gradual 
penetration of foreign banks in the local markets. These are likely to have led to 
changes in market power through mergers and acquisitions. Also, the graphs below 
(mainly Angola, Malawi and Tanzania) illustrate that the start of the global financial 
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crisis coincides with a decrease in the market power. This may be related to capital 
losses and non-performing loans suffered by many banks and rising costs which 
increased the cost of lending. 
6.3 Robustness Checks 
 
Two approaches of bank competition were estimated and the results of each of these 
yielded different conclusions. Starting with the Panzar-Rosse approach, the two tests 
(using the panel fixed effects and the FGLS approach) yield different results in terms 
of the magnitude. However, the same conclusion can be arrived at as for both tests the 
H-statics have the same signs. Tanzania was a special case as it yielded a positive H-
statistic for the first test and a negative statistic for the second test. Unlike the Lerner 
Index approach, the Panzar_Rosse was not able to generate the same conclusion as 
most literature (Bikker et al, 2012; Fosu, 2013). However, the possibility of a 
monopolistic banking competition in these countries is not impossible. The Lerner 
Index is consistent with what was suggested by past literature. The conclusion that the 
SADC countries are slightly far from behaving like monopolies is consistent with 
Clerides et al. (2013) and Gaertner and Sanya (2012). 
It can be concluded that the two approaches do not generate robust results and hence 
conclusions. This implies that a solid conclusion cannot be reached regarding the 
extent of bank competition in the SADC region.  
7. Conclusion  
 
Barriers to banking services do not only include accessibility but also inappropriate 
pricing and products. However, competition can correct this. Competition in the 
banking sector is extremely important given the fundamental role that banks play in 
the accessibility of credit, the implementation of monetary policy and the 
maintenance of systemic stability. All of these are crucial for economic development 
and so it is essential for sufficient competition to exist in this sector in order to ensure 
the smooth and efficient functioning of the banks. Nonetheless very few studies exist 
on bank competition in the southern African countries-with the exception of South 
Africa, compared with the vast literature existing for developed regions. Using two 
approaches, the Panzar-Rosse model and Lerner-Index this paper analyses whether 
there exists enough competition in the SADC banks to ensure that the region 
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continues to develop as it has.  
The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic shows that most of the banking system in the SADC 
region can be categorized as monopolies. This implies that there exist formal 
regulatory barriers to entry. Mozambique is the only country that is categorized as 
monopolistic competition. Structural impediments exist, that enable some banks in the 
country to continue to enjoy a degree of monopoly power. This outcome is not 
consistent with past literature. Broadly speaking, banks in the SADC are less 
competitive than other countries with a higher level of financial and economic 
development. However, when using the Lerner Index the results are similar to some 
past empirical findings (Clerides et al., 2013). The conclusion reached is that all 8 
countries typically have an insignificant amount of market power suggesting that 
banks in the SADC region have competitive market systems. These countries could 
possibly be characterised by a monopolistically competitive system.  
 
Studies of this nature can also help governments identify whether certain structural 
changes are have a negative or positive impact on the major sector of the economy as 
more reforms are introduced in the financial sector. This study deviates from existing 
literature, as it will contribute to the insufficient body of knowledge for SADC 
studies.  
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8. Appendix   
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A2: Lerner Index variables 
 
Cit Total operating & financial costs for bank I in time period t 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Angola 
LnInt 126 21.647 2.449 15.897 25.221 
LnIntex 126 -3.816 0.745 -6.329 -1.440 
LnPE 126 -4.197 -5.939 -5.939 -3.270 
LnOE 126 -3.921 -6.388 -6.388 -2.058 
Equity 126 -2.224 -3.598 -3.598 -1.168 
Net Loans 126 -1.269 0.493 -3.223 -0.362 
Other Income 126 -3.399 0.608 -5.352 -1.939 
LnC 129 21.269 2.346 15.732 24.967 
LnQ 129 24.453 2.450 17.768 27.754 
Botswana 
LnInt 164 20.898 2.657 16.380 25.163 
LnIntex 164 -2.794 0.865 -4.575 1.014 
LnPE 164 -3.7045 0.728 -5.835 -1.806 
LnOE 164 -3.673 1.028 -8.551 -0.663 
Equity 164 -2.121 0.667 -3.147 -0.478 
Net Loans 164 -0.689 0.511 -2.872 -0.110 
Other Income 164 -3.314 0.923 -5.211 -0.438 
LnC 76 19.226 1.257 14.978 20.866 
LnQ 76 21.863 1.330 17.979 23.592 
Malawi 
LnInt 79 20.929 1.342 16.118 23.943 
LnIntex 79 -3.021 0.674 -4.288 -1.323 
LnPE 79 -2.999 0.402 -4.411 -1.859 
LnOE 79 -2.889 0.569 -4.618 -1.338 
Equity 79 -1.907 0.439 -3.175 -0.287 
Net Loans 79 -0.961 0.451 -3.039 -0.170 
Other Income 79 -2.527 0.433 -3.859 -1.244 
LnC 80 20.770 0.654 20.029 21.844 
LnQ 80 23.088 0.860 22.109 24.643 
Mauritius 
LnInt 98 20.750 1.341 18.040 23.209 
LnIntex 98 -3.116 0.520 -4.169 -2.039 
LnPE 98 -4.542 0.330 -5.640 -3.919 
LnOE 98 -4.545 0.487 -6.576 -3.717 
Equity 98 -2.362 0.432 -3.170 -1.154 
Net Loans 98 -0.615 -0.615 -1.667 -0.105 
Other Income 98 -4.436 -4.436 -6.535 -3.454 
LnC 98 20.516 1.201 17.893 22.771 
LnQ 98 23.549 1.340 20.807 26.207 
Mozambique 
LnInt 111 19.352 1.483 14.834 22.495 
LnIntex 111 -3.224 0.559 -5.336 -1.821 
LnPE 111 -3.307 0.697 -5.010 -1.723 
LnOE 111 -2.894 0.743 -4.060 -1.245 
Equity 111 -1.838 0.572 -2.866 -0.123 
Net Loans 111 0.443 0.167 0.106 0.801 
Other Income 111 -3.180 0.514 -4.929 -1.780 
LnC 111 19.220 1.350 16.339 22.336 
LnQ 111 21.624 1.628 17.786 25.132 
South Africa 
LnInt 164 20.898 2.657 16.380 25.163 
LnIntex 164 -2.794 0.865 -4.575 1.014 
LnPE 164 -3.7045 0.728 -5.835 -1.806 
LnOE 164 -3.673 1.028 -8.551 -0.663 
Equity 164 -2.121 0.667 -3.147 -0.478 
Net Loans 164 -0.689 0.511 -2.872 -0.110 
Other Income 164 -3.314 0.923 -5.211 -0.438 
LnC 164 20.766 2.524 17.0581 24.977 
LnQ 164 23.301 2.674 19.375 27.646 
Tanzania 
LnInt 197 23.683 1.248 20.303 26.597 
LnIntex 197 -3.659 0.667 -5.532 -2.296 
LnPE 197 -3.818 0.468 -5.071 -2.515 
LnOE 197 -3.497 0.441 -5.034 -2.374 
Equity 197 -2.269 0.323 -3.847 -1.306 
Net Loans 197 -0.657 0.478 -2.065 0.324 
Other Income 197 -3.469 0.342 -4.460 -2.592 
LnC 197 23.382 1.146 20.769 25.878 
LnQ 197 26.269 1.197 23.290 28.896 
Zambia 
LnInt 106 18.089 1.259 14.272 20.328 
LnIntex 106 -3.621 1.086 -7.513 -1.741 
LnPE 106 -3269 0.648 -5.790 -1.727 
LnOE 106 -3.320 0.776 -6.015 -1.349 
Equity 106 -2.186 0.460 -3.607 -0.787 
Net Loans 106 -1.201 1.085 -6.247 6.028 
Other Income 106 -3.080 0.617 -5.801 -1.707 
LnC 106 21.610 3.452 15.033 26.705 
LnQ 106 20.626 1.157 16.893 22.665 
 30 
Q Total Assets 
W1 Interest expenses/ total deposits 
W2 
Personnel expenses /total assets  
W3 Other operating & administrative expenses/total assets 
Equity Equity/total assets 
Net Loans Net loans/total assets 
F Firm-specific effects 
Y Set of year dummies 
 
Graph A1: Individual banks’ market power (Lerner Index) for selected countries   
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Table A3: Correlation Matrices of the main variables 
 
Angola: 
 
 lnint lnintex lnpe lnoe equity netloans otherincome lnq lnc 
lnint 1         
lnintex -0.0002 1        
lnpe -0.3266 0.0199 1       
lnoe -0.3701 0.1913 0.497 1      
equity -0.1748 -0.042 0.3121 0.1043 1     
netloans 0.3182 0.4219 -0.2055 0.0537 -0.0297 1    
otherincome -0.2165 -0.22 0.5188 0.3023 0.2636 -0.2302 1   
lnq 0.6165 -0.037 -0.4457 -0.4064 -0.1058 0.2 -0.3369 1  
lnc 0.5947 0.0221 -0.4082 -0.3427 -0.14 0.2069 -0.331 0.9777 1 
 
Botswana: 
 
 lnint lnintex lnpe lnoe equity  netloans otherincome lnc lnq 
lnint 1         
lnintex -0.1067 1        
lnpe 0.0062 0.9583 1       
lnoe 0.1314 -0.2723 -0.3171 1      
equity -0.4932 -0.4924 -0.5871 0.3091 1     
netloans 0.0796 -0.1494 -0.1109 0.3706 0.3154 1    
otherincome 0.3756 0.0869 0.1317 0.2136 -0.2401 -0.0977 1   
lnc 0.9927 -0.0395 0.0718 0.1085 -0.568 0.023 0.3896 1  
lnq 0.9849 -0.211 -0.0845 0.0718 -0.4879 0.0419 0.354 0.9793 1 
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Malawi: 
 
 lnint lnintex lnpe lnoe equity netloans otherincome lnc lnq 
lnint 1         
lnintex -0.1641 1        
lnpe -0.267 0.4025 1       
lnoe -0.2995 0.2321 0.5413 1      
equity -0.1513 0.0617 0.5013 0.357 1     
netloans 0.4696 -0.1307 -0.1683 -0.137 -0.4369 1    
otherincome -0.132 -0.063 0.3101 0.4478 0.3059 0.0256 1   
lnc 0.6245 -0.0642 -0.3286 -0.1146 -0.0393 0.2312 -0.2017 1  
lnq 0.6742 -0.2718 -0.4374 -0.3217 -0.0837 0.3036 -0.2195 0.9248 1 
 
Mauritius: 
 
 lnint lnintex lnpe lnoe equity netloans  otherincome lnc lnq 
lnint 1         
lnintex -0.1642 1        
lnpe -0.0092 0.2216 1       
lnoe -0.1107 0.2085 0.4339 1      
equity 0.3364 0.2963 0.2877 -0.098 1     
netloans 0.2553 -0.1147 0.0545 0.1587 -0.0286 1    
otherincome 0.535 0.0597 0.4886 0.1973 0.382 0.0428 1   
lnc 0.9938 -0.109 0.0079 -0.0682 0.3349 0.2387 0.5445 1  
lnq 0.9655 -0.3777 -0.0742 -0.2268 0.2801 0.2116 0.4758 0.9528 1 
 
 
Mozambique: 
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 lnint lnintex lnpe lnoe equity netloans otherincome lnc lnq 
lnint 1         
lnintex 0.0856 1        
lnpe -0.2494 0.3088 1       
lnoe -0.5103 0.3415 0.847 1      
equity -0.7832 -0.0631 0.401 0.5985 1     
netloans 0.0891 0.3274 0.0066 0.0807 0.1391 1    
otherincome -0.2178 -0.1123 0.2516 0.2335 0.2166 -0.2655 1   
lnc 0.9659 0.1025 -0.2187 -0.4407 -0.7797 0.0223 -0.1986 1  
lnq 0.9425 -0.1164 -0.4683 -0.7009 -0.8189 -0.0391 -0.2306 0.9418 1 
 
South Africa: 
 
 lnint lnintex lnpe lnoe equity netloans otherincome lnc lnq 
lnint 1         
lnintex 0.2695 1        
lnpe -0.4043 0.0455 1       
lnoe -0.4855 0.0324 0.6336 1      
equity -0.4939 0.1875 0.663 0.6603 1     
netloans 0.5331 0.4068 -0.1463 -0.3415 -0.2857 1    
otherincome -0.4359 0.1031 0.6795 0.7345 0.7295 -0.3283 1   
lnc 0.9809 0.2589 -0.4055 -0.4124 -0.4503 0.489 -0.3396 1  
lnq 0.9825 0.1672 -0.4805 -0.5282 -0.5372 0.4916 -0.4424 0.9843 1 
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Tanzania: 
 
 lnint lnintex lnpe lnoe equity  netloans  otherincome lnc lnq 
lnint  1         
lnintex  -0.2065 1        
lnpe  0.0389 0.0611 1       
lnoe  -0.0173 -0.0401 0.7888 1      
equity  -0.0771 0.018 -0.311 -0.3228 1     
netloans  0.3064 0.0311 0.3772 0.4372 -0.0346 1    
otherincome  0.0372 -0.2238 0.4686 0.4813 -0.2522 -0.077 1   
lnc  0.9751 -0.1222 0.1321 0.1201 -0.1304 0.3471 0.079 1  
lnq  0.974 -0.3242 -0.0763 -0.1079 -0.044 0.2163 0.0214 0.9479 1 
 
Zambia: 
 
  lnint lnintex lnpe lnoe equity netloans otherincome lnc lnq 
lnint  1         
lnintex  -0.2136 1        
lnpe  -0.0476 0.6269 1       
lnoe  0.0418 0.509 0.6161 1      
equity  -0.1592 0.2122 0.213 0.1432 1     
netloans  0.267 0.402 0.3994 0.3876 0.0372 1    
otherincome  0.1981 0.5271 0.5367 0.4323 -0.0075 0.4375 1   
lnc  0.0565 -0.1495 -0.2729 -0.0252 0.0145 -0.0895 -0.1465 1  
lnq  0.9129 -0.5131 -0.3095 -0.1694 -0.2429 0.0885 -0.0273 0.1806 1 
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Table A4: Critical values for the test of significance 
 Reject at 1% level Reject at 5% level Reject at 10% level 
Angola, Mauritius, 
Mozambique 
 
2.617 1.980 1.658 
Botswana, Malawi, Zambia 
 
2.66 2.00 1.671 
Tanzania, South Africa 2.576 1.960 1.645 
 
Table A5: Expected signs for the Panzar-Rosse model 
 
Variables Bikker et al. (2012) Description 
LnINTEX +/- The sign of input prices in the revenue equation 
will depend on the competitive environment 
(perfect/imperfect competition) 
LnPE 
LnOE 
Equity - Lower equity ratio mplies more leverage and 
hence more interest income 
Net Loans + Banks compensate themselves for credit risk by 
means of an extra fee on the lending rate, which 
increases interest income 
Other Income - As banks increase their share of non-interest 
earning assets interest income decreases 
  
Table A6: Structure and analysis of the banking systems in the SADC regions 
 
 
Angola: 
 Angola’s financial system is highly concentrated. The top five banks account for 77% of total assets. Although banking coverage expanded from 22% in 2010 to 51% in 2013, it is still concentrated in Luanda. There are 22 commercial banks in Angola with six banks in the ranking of the top 100 largest banks on the African continent (African Business Magazine)  
Botswana: 
 Botswana’s financial sector is small and dominated (by asset size) by commercial banks and pension funds. With only 10 commercial banks in Botswana of which three are listed on the stock exchange, it has resulted in the cost of borrowing, including interest rates and other types of charges being relatively high in the country.   
Malawi: 
 Banks are dominant in Malawi’s financial system accounting about 80% of total financial sector assets. Two banks hold slightly more than half of the banking industry’s total assets and deposits. Only 19% of the population have access to financial services. Access to finance is a major challenge, especially for SMEs. Malawi is currently transitioning to Basel II accords, which will require banks to raise more capital.  
Mauritius: 
 Banks are well capitalised, with 15% of Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets well above the proposed Basel III requirements. Mauritius has 23 commercial banks with about 10 largest banks in Africa. Large foreign banks are also present in Mauritius. Most commercial banks diversified into non-banking business through subsidiaries and affiliates. There are 11 commercial banks in Malawi.  
Mozambique: 
 There are 18 registered commercial banks in Mozambique representing 95% of total financial system assets. However, 85% of the financial sector’s assets are concentrated in the three largest banks, all of which are foreign owned (two Portuguese and a South African).  
South Africa: 
 In 2013 the banking sector accounted for R3.8 trillion. The rapid expansion of non-secured lending to households, which currently accounts for about 12% of total banking exposure, has increased credit risk. Domestic banks are capitalised above the new Basel III levels and are currently operating above the minimum requirement. The country has over 50 banks of locally-controlled commercial banks, foreign-controlled ones, branches of foreign banks, foreign bank representatives, mutual banks and others.  
Tanzania: 
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